MANDAMUS AS A MEANS OF SETTLING STRIKES.
By ST pfnN B. STANTON.

The great Brooklyn strike just ended, has added its contribution to strike law, in the shape of a further definition of
the sphere of the writ of mandamus. However purposeless
its short and disastrous history may seem, however lessonless
it may appear to pass, yet, each strike, we may hope, in the
wearying succession, adds its quotum to the gradually growing fund of strike law. The experience gained in one strike,
makes the conduct of the next more intelligent, and its outcome more just; each brings us a step nearer the solution of
the underlying problems, and the removal of the underlying
evils. This hope is inspired chiefly by the ever increasing
tendency of both sides, in labor controversies, to seek protection from the courts. Judicial intervention has already given
us a jurisprudence of injunction as applicable to strikes, a
legacy left by the recent great strikes of the West and Northwest. And now the Brooklyn trolley strikes have filled a like
office with respect to the writ of mandamus.
Without going minutely into the history of the Brooklyn
strike, suffice it to say, that the usual concomitants of a strike
prevailed, lawlessness, disorder, violence and riot. Cars of
the companies returned to the stables windowless; new "nonunion" motormen, with broken heads, or not at all. The cutting of wires became a general pastime. The efforts of
Brooklyn's entire police force, and 7000 State troops, proved
unavailing as a preventive. The city authorities to lessen
their r~sponsibilities, advised the companies not to attempt
running their full complement of cars. At this juncture,
application was made to Judge Gaynor, of the New York
Supreme Court, for a writ .of mandamus, to compel the
Brooklyn Heights Railroad Co., to resume the operatihon of
its road. The writ was granted in its alternative form, and
Brooklyn, I may say the country, was astounded to read in
the learned judge's decision, the statement, that "the claim of
violence, amounting to a prevention, is not legally made out.
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Instances of violence, generally by others than the former
employ6s of the company, are shown, but it is also shown
that, not only the police force of the city, but also over 7000
soldiers are preserving order, and I cannot believe that this
company is not protected in its rights. It is entitled to thefull protection of the government in the performance of its public
duties, protection on the one side, and obedience to law and
duty on the other, being reciprocal, and going hand in
hand ...
.
It has had such protection, and it now has it. I do not
find that Government has failed in that respect at all. Instances
of disorder have occurred, but have been speedily suppressed.
I cannot, therefore, attribute to government the failure of
this corporation to perform its public duties. .

.

. That this

corporation is not fulfilling its ordinary corporate duties to the
public is not denied. It presented the issue to the court, that
the reason for it is, that it is overcome by violence, and that
the government does not adequately protect it.
This might be a sufficient answer in law, if true, but I refuse
to find that either the judicial, or the executive branch of
Government has failed in affording protection to this corporation. There is no evidence before me uport which I can cast
such a reproach upon the State."
A few days later, a similar application was made to the
same justice against the Atlantic Avenue Railroad Co., and
was similarly disposed of by him on the same grounds.
A week before Judge Gaynor's decision, however, and
before the situation had assumed the seriousness requiring the
calling out of the First Brigade, in addition to the Second
already on the scene, Judge Cullen, also of the Supreme Court
of New York, had refused just such an application 'against
the Brooklyn City Railroad Co., on the grounds that -the
duty of the company to operate its road is to be exercised
reasonably. In its operation, the company is absolutely entitled to the protection of the authorities, and to the protection
of the court. The court cannot shut its eyes to the fact that
assaults and violence have been committed, and that detachments of police are scattered all over the city. The com-
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munity owes a duty of protection to the company in operation
of its road.
As long as the acts of violence continue, the court certainly will not compel the road, by mandamus, to operate."
It does not here concern us to ascertain the cause of the
wide discrepancy between the facts, as Judge Gaynor found
them, and the facts; nor, further, why Judge Gaynor, in the
very crisis of the strike, denied the existence of assaults and
violence, to which Judge Cullen, in its beginning, had held,
the court could not " shut its eyes." Had Judge Gaynor
found the facts to be as they are generally believed to have
been, it is clear, from his reasoning, that he would not have
issued the writ.
But Judge Gaynor, and Judge Cullen, agree in stating the
rule of law, that interfering mob violence releases a railroad
from the public duty to maintain the operation of its road.
And such, of course, is the law. Even as between railroads
and private individuals, who can in no way be regarded as
responsible for its existence, mob violence releases from
liability. As for instance: "The fact that a railroad company
has reduced the wages of its employ6s, cannot be held to
justify or excuse a mob, composed of indiscriminate persons,
in stopping a train of cars, and delaying the receiving of
goods, or the transportation of freights; nor can the railroad
-company be held responsible for the consequences of such unlawful proceedings, when they cause such delay." (P. C. & St.
-L. Ry. Co. v. Hollowell, 65 Indiana, 195.) "Where employes
suddenly refuse to work, and are discharged, and delay results,
from the failure of the carrier to supply promptly their places,
such delay is attributable to the misconduct of the employfs
in refusing to do their duty, and this misconduct, in such case,
is justly considered the proximate cause of the delay; but
-when the places of the recusant employfs are promptly supplied by other competent men, and the ' strikers, then prevent
the new employ~s from doing duty by lawless and irresistible
violence, the delay resulting solely from this cause is not
.attributable to the misconduct of employ~s, but arises from the
-misconduct of persons for whose acts the carrier is in no
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manner responsible: (P., Ft. W. & C. R. R. v. Hazen, 84
Illinois, 36.) To same effect, see Geisinerv. L. S. & H. S.
R. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 563; G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lezi,
76 Texas 342; Cogley on Strikes, p. 353.
The case last quoted paints out clearly the distinction between peaceable and violent strikes as affecting a carrier's
ordinary contract liability toward shippers of fieight. The
ground of the carrier's liability in the former being found in
the fact that the delay or damage caused by the strike is due
simply to the cessation of work, which being an act or omission of employ6s, on the principle of respondent superior, the
employer, the carrier, is responsible (see cases above cited and
Blackstack v. N. Y &' Erie R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 48). We
shall expect, therefore, the same distinction and rule of responsibility to be applicable to a carrier's duty toward the
public or state, and so we find it. A railroad company is not
excused from performing its public duty of maintaining and
operating its road, simply because its men refuse to work at its
terms and quit its employ. Judge-Gaynor well stated the law
in this connection to be as follows : "Railroad companies have
duties to the public to perform, and they must perform them.
If they cannot get labor to perform such duties at what they
offer to pay, then they must pay more, and as much as is
necessary to get it.
"Likewise, if the conditions in respect of hours or otherwise
which they impose repel labor, they must adopt more lenient
or just conditions. They may not stop their cars for one
hour, much less one week or one year, to thereby beat or
coerce the price or condition of labor down to the price or
conditions they offer. . . . The company's duty was to have
gone on, and now is to go on with its full complement of
employ~s, having the right, gradually, and from day to day
to supersede its employ6s, if it can, by new emplby6s who
will work on its terms, or to supersede them all at once when
it has obtained a sufficient number of new employ~s for that
purpose; but in such a controversy it has not the right to
stop its cars while it is thus gradually getting other men."
In the case of People v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R. Co.,
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28 Hun. 543, quoted and followed by Justice Gaynor, the
court issued a writ of mandamus to enforce exactly this public
duty of the railroad. That was a case where it was not
"shown that the workmen committed any unlawful act, and
no violence, no riot and no unlawful interference with other
-employ6s" appeared. The cause of the strike was the refusal
of the company to accede to the demand of its freight handlers for an advance of wages from $I.7o a day to $2. The
total cost to the company of such increase in wages would
not have amounted to more than $3oo a day, whereas its refusal to pay this was inflicting upon the commercial community a loss of millions of dollars. Furthermore, the company failed to procure other men competent or sufficient in
number to take the place of the striking freight handlers, in
consequence of which, for two weeks, the freight service of the
railroad was practically suspended. The case thus presented
every reason for the court's interference to frustrate this impudent attempt on the part of the railroad to save money at the
expense of the community and to compel it peremptorily to
restore its freight service. Said Presiding Justice Davis, in
delivering the opinion of the court : "According to the statement of the case a body of laborers, acting in concert, fixed
a price for their labor, and refused to work at a less price.
The respondents (the railroad company) fixed a price for the
same work, and refused to pay more.
"iIn doing this, neither did an act violative of any law or subjecting either to any penalty. The respondents had a lawful
right to take their ground in respect of the price to be paid,
and adhere to it, if they chose; but, if the consequences of
doing so were an inability to exercise their corporate franchises, to the great injury of the public, they (the railroad
company) cannot be heard to assert that such consequences
must be shouldered and borne by an innocent public, who
neither directly nor indirectly participated in their causes."
The mandamus applied for against the railroad company accordingly issued.
This question arises, however, willthe common carrier becom-pelled by mandamus to resume public traffic and travel where
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these have been interrupted by a peaceable controversy in all
cases with employ6s and under all circumstances ? Judge Davis,
in the New York Central strike case, just described, asked and
answered this question as follows: " Can railroad corporations
refuse or neglect to perform their public duties upon a controversy with their employ~s over the costs or expense of doing
that? We think this question admits of but one answer.
The excuse has in law no validity. The duties imposed must
be discharged at whatever cost." In the Brooklyn City Railroad application Judge Cullen said "As between your company and the men, if the men are in a position to dictate
terms there is no reason why they should not do so." Judge
Gaynor uses equally unqualified language as to the railroad's
duty, and the court's scope of compulsion. Judge Emmons,
in Talcott v. Pine Grove, I Flippen, 145, required every farthing of a railroad's "tolls first to be devoted to paying the public
tax, and to the continuance of the road, its ample equipment
and regular operation as the interests of the community, not
those of shareholders, demand. No matter that a dividend is
never paid, that the private investment is sunk and worthless,
that the interest upon its bonds is not met, and that all its
creditors go unpaid, every dollar of its earnings must nevertheless be applied to keep up its maxium efficiency, as required
by the political powers in the law which created it. The
neglect of the smallest of these duties in which the community
is interested will be enforced by the public writ of mandamus."
But if we consider that, under certain circumstances, mandanus to a railroad company to resume is equivalent to an order
to take back its striking employ6s at their own terms, shall we
not see that this wide rule needs qualification? Is it not
apparent that then the merits of the labor controversy, .the
reasonableness of terms, becomes a subject of preliminary
judicial inquiry? Suppose, for instance, a contemplated strike
should be planned with such secrecy that the company has no
notice of it until the men actually went out on strike.
Suppose, further, that the terms for which the men struck were
not only unreasonable but extortionate, and that the annualcontracts with the men were about to be made. Of course,
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on such sudden notice, men to fill their places would not -be
obtainable short of at least a day. Can it be law that, under
these circumstances, the company must accede to the extortion
of its striking employ6s because they are in a position to dictate terms," that it refuses so to accede at peril of its charter,
and that acceptance of its employ6s' snap terms may be compelled by mandamus? That, be the terms of strikers never so
extortionate, a railroad company is bound to submit to them, if
they are only sprung upon it by the strikers with sufficient dexterity? The situation with which employ6s might thus confront
the company, clearly does not represent the true condition of
the labor market, nor serve as a standard of the just financial
relations which should exist between employer and employed.
But let us suppose still further that "due and timely"
notice of strike on the part of employfs were required bylaw, that where the company had had no notice it was
given at least a reasonable time by the court in which to
procure other men and resume operation of its road, and that
until such time the court would not compel the company by
mandamus. Yet it would still be within the power of labor,
by use of the writ of mandamus against the railroad corporation, to exact extortionate terms, even to ruin it. For instance,,
imagine labor to have become so well organized that it controls the entire labor force of the country. The employfs of
a railroad strike for exorbitant and ruinous terms. The company of course cannot replace the strikers even at just and
reasonable rates. Mandamus to the company under such.
conditions would place it at the mercy of its men who might
rifle its treasury at their pleasure under the guise of higherwages or shorter hours. The court would become an accessory to extortion. The law of free contract would give place,
to the highway law of the brigand when railroad employfs
might, with judicial sanction and aid, hold up a railroad with
the challenge " Money or your corporate life !"
Yet such are not only the possible but the probable consequences of a rule which requires a railroad to maintain and
operate its road "at whatever cost," and permits employfs to,
" dictate terms" whenever they are in a position to do so.
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One method by which the risk of injustice as above
described can be avoided is by inquiry on the part of the
court into the merits of the controversy, and when the terms
demanded by the strikers as a condition precedent to resuming
their employment are extortionate, fixing just and reasonable
terms. Such was the conception of its duty by the Supreme
Court of Montana in the case of State ex rel. Haskell v. Great
Northernz Ry. Co., 36 Pac. Rep. 458. Application was made
to it to compel the Great Northern Railway to resume the
operation of its road. The controversy was occasioned by
the general refusal of its employ6s to serve the company for
the wages proposed to be paid. They therefore went out on
strike awaiting an adjustment of the controversy. The petition alleged that sufficient, competent, skilful and experienced
men are available, ready and willing to serve the railroad
company in the operation of the railroad for reasonable compensation; and this was admitted to be the main predicate
upon which the decision would turn. "It is proposed," said
the opinion, "that the court shall inquire and determine what
would be a schedule of reasonable wages for a corps of
skilled and unskilled employes necessary to operate said
railway, and then ascertain whether the requisite number of
employ~s can be procured at wages determined, and if that
fact is found to be true, as alleged, then command the operation of said railroad, under penalties attached to disobedience
to the writ of mandamus. Those questions mentioned must
be determined by the court upon proper inquiry whether the
respondent should answer and traverse the allegations of the
petition or no, because the court, before sending forth this extraordinary writ, will, by careful inquiry, become satisfied of its own
jurisdiction, and that the conditions are such that the act commanded is feasible of performance. If the proposed scheme is
feasible, it evidently affords a remedy going far towards the
solution of a problem of great moment to all parties concerned."
It is not plain, however, upon what principle such an
inquiry proceeds. Obviously, justice demands it, yet the duty
of the road to run continuously and without interruption is
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absolute. Nothing but the act of God or the public enemy
excuses. And the mere fact that obedience to a writ of mandamus to compel performance of that duty causes the company loss, or even ruin, from extortion, is no obstacle to its
issue. To this dilemma, we believe a fixing of the attention
upon the railroad corporation solely and upon its duty to the
public, leads. Widen our view, however, and the fallacy by
which we have been thus misled is revealed, and a principle
suggests itself by which we may escape from the dilemma.
The breach of duty, calling out the mandamus against the
railroad company, consists in the suspension of the operation
of the road.
This is caused as much by the striking
employ&s as by the corporation, and is not to be laid at the
door of the latter only. There are two parties to the operation
of a railroad, and so there are two parties necessary to the
performance of the act commanded by the writ of mandamus
Compulsion of the performance of this act must be by compulsion of both of these parties. "A corporation," said Judge
Taft (in a case which see infra) "acts only through its officers
and employfs. and it is through them only that its action can
be restrained or compelled. While doing the work of the
company, the employ& is the company." To compel one of
the two parties only, is to discriminate in favor of the other
against that one, and to take sides in the quarrel between
them. A command that certain work be done can be made
effectual only by being laid upbn all persons whose participation in the work is necessary to its accomplishment. It is
inefficacious, it is unjust, it smacks of the nature of impossibility which mandamus abhors, to order one to do an act, the
doing of which depends upon the assistance of others whose
will may not be within his control.
For these reasons a writ of mandamus to compel resumption of the operation of a railway should be directed to all
whose participation and co-operation in such operation is
necessary. Observe that we are, by this line of reasoning,
inevitably led to the position that a writ of mandamus to be
complete, to be just, indeed, in many instances to be possible
of performance, must command the striking employ6s, as well
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as the railroad company itself, to resume and continue the
operation of the road.
Two objections at once present themselves. First, mandamus will not lie against private individuals like railroad
employ6s, unless they hold some relation of agency or trust
towards the public, and, except to compel performance of
some public duty. Second, to direct the writ of mandamus to
them as proposed, would be to deny their right to leave their
employment at will.
Justice Harlan, in the case of Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed.
Rep. 320 and 321, (U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals,*Seventh
Circuit, October i, 1894,) decided, over-ruling Judge Jenkins,
that railroad employ6s have the right, in a body, without
notice, and at will, to leave their employment. Consequences
to the public constitute no limit or bar to that right. In the
face of such authority, it would, indeed, seem idle to regard
the question as still open, were it not for the opposite view
taken by Judge Jenkins in the court below, (Farmer'sLoan &
Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 6o Fed. Rep. 812,) U. S.
Circuit Court, Southern District of Wisconsin, April 6, 1894 ,
and the important considerations and able reasoning upon
which he founded his decision. The question came up before
these learned justices in the form of an application for an
injunction. And, in considering the matter of enjoining
employds from leaving the employment of a railroad, the fact
that such an injunction would, in effect, be a mandatory
injunction to perform personal services, determined Justice
Harlan against its issue. An injunction to perform personal
services is, of course, without precedent in the law. Such
compunctions flow naturally, from regarding the question as
merely one of master and servant, in which the right of the
servant to quit must be preserved inviolate. If we may say
so without disrespect, the wider aspect of the question did not,
with sufficient distinctness and force, present itself to the mind
of the learned justice. By half closing his eyes to the
important public relation and duty, which all who accept
employment with a railroad company assume, he failed to find
the ground upon which judicial interference would have been
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warranted, and, if not a mandatory injunction, at least a writ
of mandamus would lie. Granted, that a court may not command the performance of an act of personal service toward
the railroad corporation, yet it may direct the performance of
an act of public service and duty. The mere fact that the one
involves the other, that to enjoin a strike, or to command
strikers to resume or would-be strikers to continue work, is,
in effect, an injunction or mandamus to perform personal service to their employer, should not deter. That is a mere incident. A mandamus to compel a railroad corporation to
resume the operation of its road, is, in effect, an order to
employ workmen, and in certain cases, (as see supra,) to
employ a designated class of workmen, to wit, the strikers,a matter with which, in its private aspect, the court has no
authority to interfere, and in doing so, is depriving the corporation of one of the rights of an employer. Nevertheless,
the courts have said: That is a mere incident. Your public
duty warrants, public welfare demands our interference.
Justice Harlan could not have had this in mind when he
said that "equity will not compel the actual, affirmative performance by an employ6 of merely personal services, any
more than it will compel an employer to retain in his personal
service one, who, no matter for what cause, is not acceptable
to him for service of that character," or again that " no court
of equity will compel any managers against their will, to keep
a particular employ6 in their employ." We have shown that
equity will do this very thing in the case of a railroad
employer by issuing its writ of mandamus under circumstances
which must inevitably lead to this very result. We see, therefore, no reason why it should not similarly interfere with the
corresponding right of railroad employ6s.
If the rights of an employer may thus be infringed, it is
difficult to see why the right of an employ 6 may not. If a
railroad corporation may be bidden to abandon its prerogative
of managing its own business in its own way, of employing
whom it will, or no one, if it will, it is difficult to see why a
railroad employ 6 may not be bidden to abandon his prerogative of throwing up employment at will. If public welfare is
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powerful enough to call for the subordination of private advantage in one case, it is equally powerful to call for it in another.
As Judge Jenkins put it in the case of the Farmers'Loan and
Trust Co. v. N. P. Ry: Co. (overruled in certain particulars by
Justice Harlan on appeal), " their (employ~s') rights, as the
rights of bondholders and stockholders, are subordinate to the
rights of the public and must yield to the public welfare."
Justice Harlan held, modifying to this extent the injunction
issued by Judge Jenkins, that a strike with the object and
intent of crippling and embarrassing the operation of the railroad was not wrongful unless violence, intimidation and such
like wrongs were resorted to, because only the exercise of an
employ6's lawful right to give up his employment at will. Is
it not safer and better policy to say with Judge Jenkins that
"a combination cannot be justified on the plea of the lawful
exercise of a right when, the threatened abandonment of service is a mere pretext, the real intent and design. being to
cripple the property and to hinder and prevent the operation
of the road, the necessary effect of which would be to inflict
great loss upon the public;" that the right of a railroad
employ6 to leave his employment must be exercised (quoting
Judge Pardee) "peaceably and decently;" that "one has
not tne right arbitrarily to quit a service without regard to the
necessities of that service."
The best argument for this view is found in the exigencies
of the case then before Judge Jenkins, which he graphically
describes, substantially as follows: "A large number of employ~s formed a combination to abandon the service of the
Northern Pacific Railroad suddenly and without reasonable
notice, with the result of crippling the operation of the railway
and injuring the public. The skilled labor necessary to the
safe operation of the road could not be readily supplied along
4,000 miles of railway. The difficulty of obtaining substitutes is intensified by the fact that no member of their organization would dare to take their place, for fear of the penalties
of expulsion and social ostracism. If this combination had
proved effective by the failure of this court to issue its preventive writ, this vast property would have been paralyzed in its
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operation, the wheels of active commerce would have ceased
to revolve, many portions of seven States would have been
shut off in the midst of winter from the necessary supply of
c!othing, food and fuel, the mails of the United States would
have been stopped, and the general business of seven States
and the commerce of the whole country passing over this
railway would have been suspended for an indefinite time. Are
all these hardships and inconveniences to be submitted to, in
order that certain of these men, discontented with the conditions of their service, may combine and conspire, with the
object and intent of crippling the property of the railroad, to
suddenly cease the performance of their duties ?"
Justice Harlan concedes that great evils are, by his view of
the law, allowed to continue; "but these evils," says he, "although arising in many cases from the inconsiderate conduct
of employ6s and employers, both equally indifferent to the
general welfare, are to be met and remedied by legislation restraining alike employ~s and employers so far as necessary
adequately to guard the rights of the public as involved in
the existence, maintenance and safe management of the public
highways." If restraining there must be, alike to employ~s
and employers, is it not well for the court to find and declare
the ground upon which such needed restraint rests and adapt
its wide equity powers to its accomplishment? The broad
language of Judge Ricks sanctions such a course: "That the
necessities growing out of the vast and rapidly multiplying
interests following our extending railway business make new
and correspondingly efficient measures for relief essential is
evident, and the courts in the exercise of their equity jurisdiction must meet the emergencies as far as possible within the
limits of existing laws until the needed legislation can be
secured."
In the case of Toledo A. A. & N. i. Ry. Co. v. Penn. Co.,
(54 Fed. Rep. 746), Judge Ricks, and (in the same case and
volume, p. 73o, both decided in U. S. Circuit Court, Northern
District of Ohio, W. D. March 25, and April 3, 1893, respectively), Judge Taft expressed views similar to those of Judge
Harlan, with respect to the unenjoinable right of railroad
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employ~s to leave their employment.
But Judge Taft's
expression of opinion was obiter, and the circumstances of the
case before Judge Ricks were far different from those of the
Northern Pacific case. The question before the latter was
whether the court had pbwer to punish for contempt certain
employ6s who had left the employment of the railroad rather
than comply with the injunction order of the court. Judge
Ricks held that they could not be so punished, as that would
be practically to construe the order as one forbidding them to
leave the railroad company's employ or, inverted into its positive form, to continue in the service of the railroad. But he
considered the question with reference only. to the three or
four employ6s then before the court. Their isolated acts in
abandoning their employment involved no violation of public
duty" Non constat, that other employ6s were ready to fill their
places. In dealing with them the court was not dealing with
acombination of employs to abandon the service of the railroad.
"An act," argued he, "when done by an individual in the
exercise of a right may be lawful, but when done by a
number, conspiring to injure or improperly influence another,
may be unlawful. One or more employ~s may lawfully quit
their employer's service at will; but a combination of a
number of them to do so for the purpose of injuring the
public and oppressing employ~s by unjustly subjecting them
to the power of the confederates for extortion or for mischief
is criminal. We do not, therefore, here determine that a conspiracy entered into by the employ6s of one railroad to boycott another railroad may not exist under such circumstances
of aggravation as to make it entirely proper for a court of
equity, in dealing with such conspiracy, to prevent an employ6
from quitting the service in which he is engaged, solely as a
means of carrying out his part in such conspiracy, and for no
other purpose than to aid in enforcing such boycott." "There
certainly are times and conditions when" the employ6s right
to quit work at will "must be denied."
That Judge Ricks would, in a similar case, incline to the position taken by Judge Jenkins, appears best from his own ]an-
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guage : Engineers and firemen "represent a class of skilled
laborers, limited in number, whose places cannot always be
supplied. The engineers on the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad, operate steam engines, moving over its different
divisions 2500 cars of freight per day. These cars carry supplies
and material, upon the delivery of which, the labor of tens of
thousands of mechanics are dependent. They transport the
products of factories, whose output must be speedily carried
away, to keep their employ6s in labor. The suspension of
work on the line of such a vast railroad, by the arbitrary
action of a body of its engineers and firemen, would paralyze
the business of the entire country, entailing losses, and bringing disaster to thousands of unoffending citizens. Contracts
would be broken, perishable property be destroyed, the traveling public embarrassed, injuries sustained, too many and too
vast to be enumerated. All these evil results would follow to
the public because of the arbitrary action of a few hundred
men, who, without any grievance of their own, without any
dispute with their employer as to wages, or hours of service,
as appears from the evidence in this case, quit their employment to aid men, it may be on some road of minor importance, who have a difference with their employer, which they
fail to settle by ordinary methods. If such ruin to the business of employers, and such disasters to the thousands of the
business public, who are helpless and innocent, is the result of
conspiracy, combination, intimidation, or unlawful acts of
organizations of employ6s, the courts have the power to grant
partial relief, at least, by restraining employ6s from committing
acts of violence and intimidation, or from enforcing rules and
regulations of organizations, which result in irremediable
injuries to their employers and to the public. It is not
necessary, for the purposes of this case, to undertake to define
with greater certainty the exact relief which such cases may
properly invoke; but that the necessities growing out of the
vast and rapidly multiplying interests following our extending
railway business, make new and correspondingly efficient
measures for relief essential is evident, and the courts, in the
exercise of their equity jurisdiction, must meet the emergen-
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cies as far as possible within the limits of existing laws, until
needed additional legislation can be secured."
The relation of railroad employ6s to the public and the
duties resulting from that relationship cannot, of course, be
deduced from the same source as in the case of a railroad corporation. The act of incorporation and the acceptance of its
franchise cannot devolve upon employ~s, who are not parties
to them, the duties which they devolve upon the corporation
itself. Nevertheless, the acceptance of employment under
such a corporation is an acceptance to that extent of the
benefits of such franchise. The employment must be deemed
to be assumed by the employ6 with a view to its nature, its
requirements, its obligations. "The primary duty of a railroad," said Judge Jenkins, in Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.
(supra), "is to the public. It must be kept a 'going' concern,
although it prove an unremunerative investment. So also,.
employ~s on entering its service assume obligations co-extensive in kind with that of the corporation. Their rights-as.
the rights of bondholders and stockholders-are subordinate
to th2 rights of the public, and must yield to public welfare."
Every contract is deemed to be entered into in view of and
with reference to the law of the land. The provisions of the
law are regarded as entering into and forming part of the contract as an implied term. This is fully and ably stated by
Judge Ricks in the Toledo case already adverted to: "Holding to that employer, so engaged in this public undertaking,.
the relation they did, they owed to it and to the public a
higher duty than though their service had been due to a
private person. They entered its service with full knowledge
of the exacting duties it owed to the public. They knew that
if it failed to comply with the laws in any respect, severe penalties and losses would follow for such neglect. An implied
obligation was, therefore, assumed by the employ6s upon
accepting service from it under such conditions, that they
would perform their duties in such manner as to enable it not
only to discharge its obligations faithfully, but also to protect
it against irreparable losses and injuries and excessive damages
by any acts of omission on their part. One of these implied
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conditions, on their behalf, was that they would not leave its
service or refuse to perform their duties under circumstances,
when such neglect, on their part, would imperil lives committed to its care, or the destruction of property involving
irreparable loss and injury, or visit upon it severe penalties. In
ordinary conditions as between employer and employ6, the
privilege of the latter to quit the former's service at his option
cannot be prevented by restraint or force. The remedy for
breach of contract may follow to the employer, but the employ6 has it in his power to arbitrarily terminate the relations,
and abide the consequences. But these relative rights and
powers may become quite different in the case of the employ~s of a great public corporation, charged by the law with
certain great trusts and duties to the public. The very nature
of their service, involving as it does the custody of human
life, and the safety of millions of property, imposes upon them
obligations and duties commensurate with the character of the
trusts committed to them."
In the case then before the learned justice, it was held that
a railway employ6 is amenable to an injunction order issued to
secure compliance with a requirement of interstate commerce
law. If a railway employ6, by virtue of his contract and the
nature of his employment, assumes such a duty of compliance
with the law, in that case, that he may be held to it by injunction, why he is not equally bound and why may he not be
eqjually coerced with respect to the well-known law requiring
continuous and uninterrupted operation of a railroad ? This
requirement is part of the law surrounding his employment
with reference and in obedience to which a railroad employ6
contracts. To that extent then, he engages to maintain the
uninterrupted operation of the railroad, and to that extent there
devolves upon him the public duty to do so.
Railroad employ6s, said Judge Taft, in the case 4Teady cited,
"are fully identified with the employer in the discharge of his
public funct ons." "Corporations," to quote Judge Ricks further, "can act only through their officers, agents and servants,
so that the mandatory provisions of the law, which apply to the
corporation, apply with equal force to its officers and employ~s."

MANDAMUS

AS A MEANS

OF SETTLING STRIKES.

I 19

The writer believes that the public should be saved the
inconven'ence and the commercial paralysis consequent to
railroad strikes, not by judicial intervention against one side
to the controversy only, but against both sides. Injunction in
form, this intervention should be, when undertaken before the
strike and in contemplation thereof; thereafter in form of
mandamus; b'it in both cases against both employer and
.employS, railroad corporation and railroad operators.
There need to be no fear for the practicability of this course
on the score of the impossibility of making all employ~s parties,
or of serving them with notice either of the application or of its
.allowance. These formalities have been decided to be unnecessary, and the court's order binding upon all officers and employ6s of the railroad, having actual knowledge of its existence and scope. (See the two Toledo cases, szpra.) The deadlock, to end which is the public's concern and the court's ground
of interference, is most effectively ended by controlling and
coercing all implicated in it. It has been shown at the begining of this article that a mandamus against a railroad corporation alone might result in forcing the corporation to employ
strikers at their own terms. It will readily be seen that a
mandamus or mandatory injunction against strikers alone
would be an equal discrimination on the part of the court by
forcing them frequently to work for the company against their
will, at its terms. In directing a mandamus against both corporation and employfs, discrimination in favor of either side of
the labor controversy is avoided. But better still an opportunity, nay a necessity, of doing justice between them as regards the merits of the controversy is thus afforded to the court.
If both company and employts are ordered by the court to cooperate in the resumption of operation of the railroad, some
terms upon which they are to do so must from the necessities
of the situation be prescribed. This involves a judicial inquiry
into what terms are just, and as to whether employers' or
employ~s' terms or some terms between the two are to govern.
The duty, the opportunity of judicial intervention in and
regulation and prevention of strikes will thus at last be found.
New York, February, z895.

